The sales team's ability to deliver the plan is priced into the deal before anyone tests it. Commercial diligence reads the data room: bookings, pipeline, concentration, and churn. The data room shows what the team produced and says nothing about whether the same people can produce the plan under new ownership. This page gives the deal team the pre-LOI checklist, then a five-gate test for how much of a concentrated seller's revenue survives their departure and the arithmetic that turns the answer into an enterprise-value figure.
The enterprise value sitting with one or two salespeople equals the contribution from revenue that would fail to transfer after their departure, multiplied by the buyer's entry multiple. Compute it seller by seller from the target's revenue records, contract schedule, account history and buyer-contact records.
The seller's headline revenue share is only the starting input. Contract term, account origination, an active successor, and an enforceable written restraint determine whether that revenue belongs to the company after the seller leaves.
Start with the account that shows no meeting with a second company contact in the last two quarters. Confirm the gap against calendar and email records before treating it as fact, because the activity log is usually maintained by the seller under test.
Revenue Bench, a United States sales recruitment firm, runs a sales team assessment: a sales-specific assessment of the target's sales leader and quota-carrying team between the LOI and close, with management's consent, inside the announced diligence workstream sponsored by management. The quota attainment assessment is the deal team's own read of the data room, or a commercial-diligence adviser's, before the LOI with no access to the team. The six reads of the attainment record are set out below.
Attainment shows what each seller produced under the current owner, against a target someone set. It cannot show whether the same people can produce the plan under new ownership. Revenue Bench's assessment measures the leader's capability to set standards, coach, recruit, and hold the team accountable, and each seller's selling capability, role fit, and dependence on founder relationships. The pre-LOI checklist includes the attainment request and its red flag: attainment concentrated in two or three reps while the median misses.
Revenue Bench assesses sales team readiness for PE ownership between the LOI and close, with management's consent. Readiness means whether the leader can build the team the plan requires and which sellers can perform under the new ownership plan. The assessment completes in days. Results should reach the buyer under the same confidentiality protocol as the rest of diligence, and employee assessment data should stay inside that protocol. The provider scope table sets out Revenue Bench's transaction work: the pre-close sales-team assessment and the search for permanent revenue roles after close. A search begins on a mandate after close.
Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest. The deal team reads the quota-attainment record and runs the five-gate seller-concentration test from the data room without Revenue Bench, so it can set the assessment's findings beside its own reading.
The deal model assumes the go-to-market organization delivers. Diligence tests the market, pipeline math, customer concentration, and churn. The evidence on the people carrying the plan is usually management's account of them plus a small set of meetings.
Sales-team diligence runs in two windows. The outside-in review comes before the LOI. An evidence-led assessment follows between the LOI and close. Both feed the same decision: price it, plan for it, or pass. The repeated-mistake ledger for private equity sales hiring shows where the cost lands when either window is skipped.
Carlos Garrido, who spent more than 30 years in investment banking before building a sales practice, teaches that "Your valuation scales only when your absence doesn't threaten the business." The same principle applies to a top seller. A buyer is paying for revenue that survives the departure of the person who originated or manages it.
Everything on this list can be checked from the data room, public sources, and management meetings before exclusivity, with no access to the team.
| Area | What to request or check | What it tells you | The red flag |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue concentration | Revenue by rep for the trailing 24 months | Whether the plan depends on one or two sellers | One seller carries more than a third of revenue. That threshold is Revenue Bench's own working figure for opening the transfer test below, not a published standard. |
| Founder dependence | The founder's named accounts and role in the top 10 deals | Whether revenue transfers to a team, or leaves with the founder | The founder is the de facto top seller and the close plan has no transition owner |
| Sales leadership | The sales leader's tenure, background, and operating cadence: forecast, pipeline review, coaching rhythm | Whether a leader runs the team or the CEO does | No documented cadence; the CEO personally closes anything material |
| Team turnover | Departures by role for 3 years, with hire date and tenure at departure, voluntary and managed out | The replacement spend the P&L does not isolate | No departure records kept by role and tenure, or departures concentrated in the first year of tenure. In DePaul's 2011-2012 Sales Effectiveness Survey of 435 B2B sales organizations, 33% of all sales turnover happened in the first year of tenure. Across the economy, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employee Tenure release of September 24, 2026 puts median tenure in sales and related occupations at 3.3 years in January 2026, against 4.1 years across all wage and salary workers. BLS publishes no first-year rate for any occupation. |
| Hiring history | The last 5 sales hires: source, ramp time, still employed or not | Whether the company can add capacity, or burns it | A majority of recent hires gone inside 18 months |
| Pipeline integrity | Pipeline by stage with entry criteria, plus win rates by stage | Whether the pipeline is a forecast or a wish list | No stage criteria; win rates unmeasured; coverage claims that move between meetings |
| Compensation plan | Plan documents plus actual earnings by rep for 2 years, anonymized by employee ID | Whether pay drives the behavior the plan needs | Top earners paid on legacy accounts they no longer work |
| Customer proof | Churn and expansion by cohort, referenceable accounts | Whether the motion produces customers who stay and grow | Logo churn offsetting new logos; references all pre-date the current team |
| Sales process | The documented process, CRM discipline, definition of a qualified opportunity | Whether results are repeatable or personal | The process exists only in the top seller's head |
| Quota and capacity | Quota attainment by rep, 2 years | How much of the team can carry the plan | Attainment concentrated in two or three reps while the median misses |
Every row is checkable before exclusivity; none of it requires talking to the sales team. The first row supplies the starting number for the seller-concentration test below.
Read the attainment record seller by seller and quarter by quarter. A team average can reach target while most of the team misses. Check how each target was set and whether it moved. Separate ramped sellers from sellers still ramping, and trace where each top seller's attainment came from. Set the plan's required production per seller beside what the history shows, and put departed sellers back into the history.
These reads extend the "Quota and capacity" row of the pre-LOI checklist. Request rep-level records anonymized by employee ID. Most of these records are kept by the sales team under review, so confirm a sample against commission statements or the compensation plan documents before treating a reading as fact, and against payroll once confirmatory diligence opens it.
| The read | What to request | A sound reading | The reading that needs more work |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spread across the team | Attainment against target by seller, by quarter, for two years. | Attainment spreads across the roster and the median seller is near target. | The team total reaches target because two or three sellers far exceed theirs while the median misses. |
| How targets were set | Each seller's target, the written method used to set it, and every change made during the year, including quota relief. | Targets were set before the year by a written method, changes are recorded with a reason, and attainment is reported against the original and the revised target. | Targets were lowered or relief was granted during the year with no recorded reason, or attainment is reported only against the revised target. |
| Ramped and ramping | Each seller's hire date, the ramp schedule, and the quarters each seller carried a full target. | Ramped sellers are read on their own and their record supports the plan. | Ramping sellers are averaged in, or the plan counts sellers still ramping at full capacity. |
| Where attainment came from | Each seller's attainment split by new logos, renewals, expansion, and accounts inherited or assigned from the founder or a departed seller. | Top sellers' attainment comes mostly from accounts they opened or grew. | Top attainment comes from inherited house accounts or founder-originated deals. Run the seller-concentration test on that seller. |
| Capacity against the plan | The plan's bookings target and the quota-carrying headcount it assumes, with planned hire dates. | The plan asks each ramped seller for production the history shows the current team delivering. | The plan needs the median seller to produce what only the top sellers have produced, or counts unfilled positions at full production. |
| Departed sellers | Attainment for every seller who left in the two years, matched by employee ID to the departure records in the checklist's Team turnover row. | The history includes departed sellers, so the record covers the team as it ran. | The record covers the current roster only, so a team that lost its weaker sellers reads stronger than it ran. |
These reads are Revenue Bench's own guidance, built on the checklist above. No study stands behind them, and the page publishes no threshold for any of them.
The reads show what the team produced and against what target. Whether the current sellers can carry the plan's targets under new ownership is the question the sales-specific assessment between the LOI and close answers. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest. The deal team, or its adviser, runs all six reads from the data room without Revenue Bench, so it can set the assessment's findings beside its own reading. Results and employee assessment data stay inside the diligence confidentiality protocol.
A PE firm can assess pipeline quality and the sales process at an acquisition target from the data room itself, or engage a commercial-diligence adviser to do it. Both read the same records: stage definitions, conversion history, close-date history, forecast records, and sampled won and lost deals. Revenue Bench's sales-specific assessment of the sales leader and quota-carrying team, run between the LOI and close with management's consent, tests the people who run that process.
Most records in these tests are kept by the sales team whose work is under review, so confirm a sample against invoices, contracts and calendar records before treating a reading as fact. The tests extend the pipeline-integrity and sales-process rows of the pre-LOI checklist.
| The test | What to request | A sound reading | The reading that needs more work |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stage definitions | Written stage definitions with entry criteria, and the CRM field that records each stage. | Each stage requires a buyer action, and a sample of open opportunities meets the stated criteria. | Stages describe seller activity alone, or sampled opportunities fail their own stage criteria. |
| Conversion by stage | Stage-to-stage conversion and win rates by stage, by rep, for two years. | Rates are measured, and the plan's assumed coverage rests on win rates shown in the history. | Rates are unmeasured, or the plan's coverage assumes a win rate the history does not show. |
| Deal age and slippage | Open opportunities with created date, date of entry into the current stage, and close-date change history. | Stalled deals are closed out under a written rule, and close dates change for recorded reasons. | The same deals are pushed quarter after quarter, or no close-date history is kept. |
| Forecast against outcome | Each quarter's committed forecast, taken at the same point in the quarter, beside closed revenue, for two years. | The commit lands near the outcome, and misses trace to named deals. | No past forecasts are kept, or the commit is rebuilt in every meeting. |
| Pipeline source | New pipeline and closed revenue by source (founder, each seller, marketing, partners) for two years. | New pipeline comes from more people than the founder and the top seller. | The founder or one seller is the main source of new pipeline. Run the seller-concentration test on that person. |
| Process in use | The documented sales process, qualified-opportunity definition, and a sample of won and lost deals with their CRM records. | Won and lost deals across reps show the same qualification steps recorded. | The document exists but each rep's records show a different process, or the top seller's deals skip the steps. |
These tests are Revenue Bench's own guidance, built on the checklist above. No study stands behind them, and the page publishes no threshold for any of them.
The tests show whether the process produces a forecast the plan can rely on. Whether that forecast holds under new ownership depends on the leader who runs the process. The assessment evidence between the LOI and close measures the leader's capability to set standards, coach, recruit, and hold the team accountable.
Revenue Bench's published transaction work is the assessment of the sales leader and quota-carrying team before close and the search for permanent revenue roles after close, as set out in the provider scope table. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest. A deal team runs all six tests from the data room itself, so it can set the assessment's findings beside its own reading.
Sales and revenue diligence support for an acquisition comes from the deal team's own reading of the data room, from a commercial-diligence adviser for market, pipeline and customer work, and from a quality-of-earnings review of reported earnings. Revenue Bench runs a sales-specific assessment of the target's sales leader and quota-carrying team between the LOI and close, with management's consent. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
Seller concentration is the share of revenue that does not survive a seller's departure. A seller can carry a large book that remains with the company through signed contracts and active relationships held by other employees. A smaller personally sourced book of renewable-at-will accounts can create a larger exposure.
In OMG's data on 318 sales teams, 30% rely on a single salesperson for more than half of revenue. The sample counts teams, and OMG publishes no collection period. A high reading is a common condition. It remains an exposure that the buyer must test.
Run the five gates in order. Reconcile each answer to the customer ledger before using it in the model.
| Gate | What to pull | What the answer means | The reading that should stop the deal team |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share | Trailing-12-month revenue by seller. Calculate the top seller's share and the top two sellers' combined share. | This establishes how much reported revenue passes through each concentrated seller before transfer is tested. | The seller report does not reconcile to trailing-12-month revenue, so no gate below can be run on a reliable base. |
| Term | The contract schedule for each account in the seller's book, including counterparty, remaining term, renewal date, and at-will status. | Contract-bound revenue survives a departure for the remaining term. At-will revenue is exposed on the day of resignation. | The at-will share is material and the model treats the full book as continuing revenue past the resignation date. |
| Origination | CRM origination records, assignment history, predecessor records, and management confirmation for each account. | Assigned and inherited accounts usually transfer with the role. Personally sourced accounts often hold the buying relationship in the seller's name. | Personally sourced revenue is material to the case and the model gives it the same transfer assumption as an assigned account. |
| Succession | Meeting records for each concentrated account. Identify a second named company participant who met the buyer during the last two quarters. | An org chart does not satisfy this gate. The record must show another person with a current working relationship at the account. | Any concentrated account has zero qualifying meetings with a second company contact during the test period. |
| Restraint | The seller's signed non-solicitation agreement and deal counsel's view of its value where the seller works. | Enforceability varies by jurisdiction and is a question for deal counsel. This page gives no legal advice. | No written agreement is available, or counsel cannot support the reliance the model places on it. |
The transfer test joins the customer contract to the account's origination history and the record of recent buyer meetings. It converts a general key-person concern into evidence about who owns the commercial relationship. The same dependence appears at portfolio level in the portfolio mistake of leaving key-person concentration untreated.
Run these gates against the top two sellers only. Applying them across the full team is a different exercise and this page does not require it. When succession fails, the sales-talent bench guide sets out the pre-close remedy for key-person concentration.
The calculation starts after the share test. It prices the earnings attached to revenue that fails the term and origination gates. Succession and restraint remain recorded beside the result because no evidence-based percentage exists for converting either yes-or-no answer into a valuation adjustment.
At-risk revenue = concentrated seller's trailing-12-month revenue × share of that revenue renewable at will × share of the at-will revenue the seller personally sourced
At-risk contribution = at-risk revenue × contribution margin on that revenue
Exposure to enterprise value = at-risk contribution × buyer's entry multiple
Revenue and earnings are separate inputs. The calculation therefore moves through contribution margin before it reaches enterprise value. Use the target's account-level margin where the record exists. Where it does not, document the margin estimate and test the result across the buyer's own downside cases.
The entry multiple is applied to contribution, and contribution sits above operating cost. That step assumes the fixed-cost base does not fall when the revenue leaves. Where the target can remove cost with the account, apply the multiple to contribution net of that cost and record the change.
This illustration uses round numbers and has no company behind it. A target has $20 million of trailing-12-month revenue. Its top seller carries 30%, equal to $6 million. The contract schedule shows that 40% of the seller's book is at will. The origination record shows that 70% of that at-will book was personally sourced.
The illustration leaves $4.32 million of the seller's book outside the exposure calculation because it is contract-bound, company-originated, or both. That treatment is why headline revenue share cannot stand alone. Substitute the target's own figures at every step.
Enter the target's figures for its top seller, and the second seller if one exists. The calculator runs the three steps above in order and applies the cost adjustment where you enter one. The figures you enter stay in your browser.
Read the figure as an upper bound. The arithmetic assumes the whole at-risk amount leaves and stays gone, and it does not estimate the probability of a departure.
Customer concentration and seller concentration can name the same accounts. Where the model also discounts a concentrated customer, reconcile the account-level cash flows before using both figures. This page publishes no rule for combining them.
Revenue Bench runs a separate sales-team assessment between the LOI and close, with management's consent, and is paid when a search after close places a hire. Talk to us about a target.
Seller concentration has no published valuation convention. Revenue Bench searched for one and found no primary source that quantifies how revenue carried by one or two salespeople affects a private-market multiple.
In The Key Person Discount in Light of the Integrated Theory of Business Valuation, published May 10, 2021, Z. Christopher Mercer of Mercer Capital writes, "There is no market evidence to provide a basis for assessing the reasonableness of a judgmental key person discount." His position places the effect in expected cash flows and the company-specific risk premium.
This page therefore publishes no discount range for seller concentration. The calculation above runs on the buyer's own entry multiple and the target's own contribution data. Revenue Bench has nothing to publish here that a study supports.
That refusal is limited to the multiple-impact question. Revenue Bench does publish its own working figure of $200,000 to $250,000 for a revenue-role mis-hire. That figure covers replacement cost and lost operating time. It does not quantify how seller concentration changes a private-market multiple.
The exposure can also change the operating plan. The first-100-days decision sequence turns failed succession gates into named post-close work. The private equity sales-hiring playbook carries the same exposure into portfolio hiring governance.
The checklist and the five gates show what the organization produced and how much revenue may fail to transfer. Between the LOI and close, with management's consent, a sales-specific assessment of the leader and quota-carrying team shows whether the same people can deliver the plan.
The assessment measures the leader's capability to set standards, coach, recruit, and hold the team accountable. It also measures each seller's selling capability, role fit, and dependence on founder relationships. The guide to what a sales-specific assessment measures explains how those findings differ from interview evidence.
Timing fits a deal calendar. In Revenue Bench's assessment-led process, the assessment stage runs 2 to 4 business days per slate. An existing team can be assessed and debriefed on the same short timeline.
Run the work with management's consent, sponsored by management as part of the announced diligence workstream and positioned to the team as planning for the business under a change of ownership. Say nothing to the team that is untrue about the purpose. Results should reach the buyer under the same confidentiality protocol as the rest of diligence.
OMG's assessment dataset places 6% of salespeople in the Elite tier, 11% in Strong, 33% in Serviceable, and 50% in Weak. A target team that assesses as mostly Serviceable is normal. The diligence question is which people fit their current role and whether the leader can develop them.
In OMG's evaluation of 44,493 sales managers, 9% were strong in all three coaching qualities, and managers with all three produce 80% more elite salespeople, according to OMG's data. That evidence belongs in any decision about whether to promote a strong rep into sales management.
In OMG's 2024 validation survey, first-year turnover ran 9% for hires the assessment recommended and 33% for hires it advised against. This is a selection comparison between those two candidate groups. It is not a measured treatment effect.
DePaul University's Center for Sales Leadership, in its 2011-2012 Sales Effectiveness Survey of 435 B2B sales organizations, puts the average cost of sales turnover near $49,508 and close to $115,000 fully loaded.
A target with weak selection carries a replacement-cost liability. A quality-of-earnings review covers reported earnings, so this liability sits outside it and needs its own line. How that gap multiplies across quota-carrying headcount is set out in the operating partner's turnover model.
This section prices replacement cost per departure. The seller-concentration calculation prices revenue that does not transfer. They belong on different lines in the model.
An exposure figure gives the deal team a model input. The buyer can reflect that amount in price, cover it through deal structure with counsel, or require succession work before close. The evidence and the buyer's risk tolerance decide which route fits. This page recommends no legal instrument.
A team that cannot deliver the plan without rebuilding creates a second cost line. A plan to add four sellers to a three-seller team underperforms when the current revenue base depends on a person whose accounts do not transfer. New capacity must replace exposed contribution before it can support growth.
The findings can become the first-100-days plan, which carries this baseline into the post-close decision sequence. The portfolio sales-hiring governance model starts with the keep, coach, or replace decision on the sales leader you inherited, followed by sequenced replacements under written guarantee terms.
Some evidence ends the process before the LOI. This standard sits behind the searches Revenue Bench runs for private equity firms and their portfolio companies.
The instrument measures exposure. It does not estimate the probability that a seller leaves, and it does not estimate how much of the at-risk revenue a departure removes. The arithmetic assumes the whole at-risk amount leaves and stays gone. A departure often keeps part of the book through a successor or a renewal cycle, so read the figure as an upper bound and model the share the deal team expects to recover.
The gates rely on data-room records supplied by management. Missing CRM history can make origination unclear, and incomplete meeting records can make a working succession relationship look absent. Reconcile the files to contracts and customer records before treating a failed gate as fact.
Account activity records are usually maintained by the seller whose book is being tested, so confirm a failed succession gate against a source that seller does not control.
Account-level contribution margin is often absent from management reporting. The middle step is therefore frequently an estimate. Show the estimate separately and test the exposure across the buyer's own margin cases.
Customer concentration and seller concentration can name the same accounts. A model that discounts a concentrated customer and also removes contribution because its seller may leave can count the same loss twice, or measure two distinct paths to the same loss. This page publishes no rule for resolving that interaction. The deal team must reconcile the account-level cash flows in its own model.
The five-gate seller-concentration test and the enterprise-value exposure mechanism are Revenue Bench's own instruments. They use the buyer's entry multiple and the target's records. The worked example is an illustration with no company behind it.
Figures attributed to Objective Management Group are OMG's own published data, dated to the 2024 validation era where stated, and analyzed for Revenue Bench by Steve Swanston through Swanston Growth Advisors, a Certified Partner of Objective Management Group. The concentration sample contains 318 sales teams and counts teams. OMG publishes no collection period for that figure.
OMG's talent distribution, sales-manager findings, and first-year turnover comparison are OMG's own published data. In OMG's 2024 validation survey, first-year turnover ran 9% for hires the assessment recommended and 33% for hires it advised against. The comparison concerns candidate selection groups and does not establish a measured treatment effect.
DePaul University's Center for Sales Leadership, in its 2011-2012 Sales Effectiveness Survey of 435 B2B sales organizations, puts the average cost of sales turnover near $49,508 and close to $115,000 fully loaded. In DePaul's 2011-2012 Sales Effectiveness Survey of 435 B2B sales organizations, 33% of all sales turnover happened in the first year of tenure. The denominator is total turnover.
In the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employee Tenure release of September 24, 2026, median tenure in sales and related occupations was 3.3 years in January 2026, against 4.1 years across all wage and salary workers. The measure is median tenure. It is not a turnover rate. BLS publishes no first-year rate for any occupation.
Revenue Bench uses $200,000 to $250,000 as its own working figure for a revenue-role mis-hire. It is an operating estimate and is not presented as research. No client case results appear on this page.
There are two windows. Before the LOI: data-room evidence, including revenue by rep, turnover, hiring history, pipeline discipline, quota attainment, and compensation outcomes, plus management meetings. Between the LOI and close, with management's consent: a sales-specific assessment of the leader and quota-carrying team measuring selling capability, role fit, coaching strength, and dependence on founder relationships. Together they show whether the people behind the numbers can deliver the plan.
A PE firm should check revenue concentration by rep, founder dependence, sales-leadership cadence, turnover and hiring history, pipeline integrity, compensation outcomes, customer churn, the documented sales process, and quota attainment distribution. All are checkable from the data room and management meetings without team access.
Red flags include one seller carrying more than a third of revenue, which is Revenue Bench's own working threshold rather than a published standard, the founder serving as the de facto top seller with no transition owner, no leader-run operating cadence, no departure records by role and tenure, a majority of recent hires gone inside 18 months, and a pipeline with no stage criteria.
Yes. Between the LOI and close, with management's consent, the assessment can run inside the announced diligence workstream, sponsored by management and positioned to the team as planning for the business under a change of ownership. A sales-specific assessment completes in days and shows whether the leader can build the team the plan requires and which sellers can perform under the new ownership plan. Where this sits against the rest of the hold period is set out in the hold-period stage map, and it appears as its own row in the provider scope table.
Revenue Bench, a United States sales recruitment firm, runs a sales team assessment of the target's sales leader and quota-carrying team between the LOI and close, with management's consent, inside the announced diligence workstream sponsored by management. The quota attainment assessment is the deal team's own read of the data room, or a commercial-diligence adviser's, before the LOI with no access to the team. The six reads of the attainment record cover the spread across the team, how targets were set, ramped and ramping sellers, where attainment came from, capacity against the plan, and departed sellers. Results and employee assessment data stay inside the diligence confidentiality protocol. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
Read attainment seller by seller and quarter by quarter, using six reads: the spread across the team, how targets were set, ramped and ramping sellers, where attainment came from, capacity against the plan, and departed sellers. Request rep-level records anonymized by employee ID, and confirm a sample against commission statements or the compensation plan documents before treating a reading as fact, because most of these records are kept by the sales team under review. Attainment shows production under the current owner, and Revenue Bench's sales-specific assessment between the LOI and close tests whether the current sellers can carry the plan under new ownership. Results and employee assessment data stay inside the diligence confidentiality protocol. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
Revenue Bench assesses sales team readiness for PE ownership between the LOI and close, with management's consent. Readiness covers whether the leader can build the team the plan requires and which sellers can perform under the new ownership plan. Results should reach the buyer under the same confidentiality protocol as the rest of diligence. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
A PE firm can assess pipeline quality and the sales process at an acquisition target from the data room itself, or engage a commercial-diligence adviser, using six tests: stage definitions, conversion by stage, deal age and slippage, forecast against outcome, pipeline source, and process in use. Revenue Bench runs a sales-specific assessment of the sales leader and quota-carrying team between the LOI and close, with management's consent, which tests the people who run that process. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
Sales and revenue diligence support for an acquisition comes from the deal team's own reading of the data room, from a commercial-diligence adviser for market, pipeline and customer work, and from a quality-of-earnings review of reported earnings. Revenue Bench runs a sales-specific assessment of the target's sales leader and quota-carrying team between the LOI and close, with management's consent. Revenue Bench is paid when a search after close places a hire, so a finding that the leader or a seller should be replaced runs in its interest.
DePaul University's Center for Sales Leadership, in its 2011-2012 Sales Effectiveness Survey of 435 B2B sales organizations, puts the average cost of sales turnover near $49,508 and close to $115,000 fully loaded. In OMG's 2024 validation survey, first-year turnover ran 9% for hires the assessment recommended and 33% for hires it advised against. That comparison concerns candidate selection groups and does not establish a measured treatment effect.
Multiply the seller's trailing-12-month revenue by the share renewable at will, then by the share of that at-will revenue the seller personally sourced. Multiply the result by contribution margin, then by the buyer's entry multiple. The multiple step assumes the fixed-cost base does not fall with the lost revenue. Record succession and restraint findings beside the figure because no evidence-based percentage converts either answer into a valuation adjustment. The calculator on this page runs the same arithmetic on the target's own figures.
No. Revenue share is the first gate. Contract term and account origination determine how much of the book enters the exposure calculation. A second active company relationship tests succession. A written non-solicitation agreement receives the value deal counsel assigns where the seller works.
Pull the customer contract and remaining term, the account's origination and assignment history, and meeting records for the last two quarters. The account passes the succession gate when a second named company participant has a current working relationship with the buyer. An org chart alone does not establish transfer.
No. Revenue Bench found no primary source that quantifies the multiple impact of seller concentration. The page therefore uses the buyer's entry multiple and the target's contribution data. Revenue Bench does publish its own $200,000 to $250,000 working figure for a revenue-role mis-hire, but that operating estimate answers a different cost question.
Revenue Bench runs sales-team assessment for diligence and the searches that follow close, under published guarantee terms.
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